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Abstract
Let L be a language decided by a constant-round quantum Arthur-Merlin (QAM) protocol
with negligible soundness error and all but possibly the last message being classical. We prove
that if this protocol is zero knowledge with a black-box, quantum simulator S, then L ∈ BQP.
Our result also applies to any language having a three-round quantum interactive proof (QIP),
with all but possibly the last message being classical, with negligible soundness error and a
black-box quantum simulator.
These results in particular make it unlikely that certain protocols can be composed in parallel
in order to reduce soundness error, while maintaining zero knowledge with a black-box quantum
simulator. They generalize analogous classical results of Goldreich and Krawczyk (1990).
Our proof goes via a reduction to quantum black-box search. We show that the existence of a
black-box quantum simulator for such protocols when L /∈ BQP would imply an impossibly-good
quantum search algorithm.
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1 Introduction
A zero-knowledge (ZK) protocol for language L allows a prover to convince a verifier the member-
ship of an input x in L, without disclosing any extra information. That is when x ∈ L, anything
efficiently computable after interacting with the prover could also have been efficiently computed
without the interaction. Such protocols play a central role in cryptography. However, practical
protocols must be both secure and round-efficient. Parallel composition is a common technique for
reducing the error probability of an interactive protocol without increasing the number of rounds,
and therefore one is interested in parallel-composing ZK protocols while maintaining the ZK prop-
erty. However, Goldreich and Krawczyk [1] proved that only BPP languages have three-round
interactive proofs with negligible soundness error, that are black-box-simulation ZK. This pre-
cludes parallel composition of the well-known three-round ZK protocols for Graph Isomorphism
while maintaining black-box zero knowledge, unless the language is in BPP. Moreover, [1] also
precludes parallel composition of any constant-round Arthur-Merlin (AM) black-box-simulation
ZK protocols except for languages in BPP.
Precise definitions of these terms, and of the other classes that we will informally introduce
in this section, are given in Section 2. Roughly, the concept of zero-knowledge is formalized by
requiring an efficient simulator that produces a probability distribution indistinguishable from the
distribution of the original verifier’s conversations with the honest prover. Black-box-simulation
ZK means that the simulator is only allowed to call the verifier as a black-box subroutine. In an
AM protocol, the verifier’s messages are fair coin tosses.
In this work, we revisit the problem of parallel composition of black-box-ZK protocols from
the perspective of quantum computation, and find that the impossibility results of [1] extend even
to certain quantum cases. Quantum computation has significant consequences for cryptography,
especially since exponential speedups by quantum computers have been found for problems that
are crucial in current cryptographic systems. In the specific context of zero knowledge, quantum
computers raise several interesting questions:
1. Quantum simulators: What happens if one weakens the zero-knowledge requirement
to say that, if x ∈ L, anything efficiently computable after interacting with the prover,
could also have been efficiently computed on a quantum computer without the interac-
tion? In other words, we allow the black-box simulator to be a quantum computer and
ask if round-efficient ZK protocols can exist for a larger class of languages than BQP (refer
to Definition 6). It is encouraging that black-box quantum simulators are known to be more
powerful than black-box classical simulators in some settings. For example, Watrous [2] has
given a black-box quantum simulator for the standard three-round Graph Isomorphism pro-
tocol that succeeds with probability exactly one, whereas classical simulators for the same
protocol succeed with probability only approaching one. Perhaps quantum exact simulators,
as in [2], could be helpful in maintaining black-box ZK under parallel composition.
2. Quantum messages: What happens for protocols with quantum messages? We know
that every quantum statistical zero-knowledge (QSZK) language has a black-box quantum-
simulation zero-knowledge, three-round quantum Arthur-Merlin (QAM) protocol [2, 3].1
The soundness error of these protocols is exponentially close to 1/2. If the [1] result extends
to the QAM case, then this would give strong evidence against parallel repetition of QAM
protocols to reduce soundness error to be exponentially small, unless BQP = QSZK.
1The first and third messages of the QAM protocol are quantum, and the second message, from the verifier, is a
classical coin flip. See Definition 3.
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Our Results:
We answer the first question above and make partial progress on the second. We prove that only
BQP languages have three-round interactive protocols (IP) (see Theorem 2), or constant-round
AM protocols (see Theorem 3), that have negligible soundness error and are black-box quantum
simulation ZK.2 Our results also hold if the last message from the prover in these protocols
is a quantum message. In particular, only BQP languages have black-box quantum-simulation
ZK, negligible-soundness, three-round QAM protocols with the first two messages being classical.
We show our results for computational zero knowledge and therefore they apply as well for the
stricter notions of statistical and perfect zero knowledge.
Our Techniques:
Let us now briefly discuss our techniques and the central idea of reduction to search. For sim-
plicity, assume a three-round QAM protocol Π for a language L with all three protocol messages
being classical but a quantum verifier (see Definition 3). Assume that Π is black-box-simulation
QCZK with negligible soundness error. We prove L ∈ BQP by exhibiting an efficient quantum
algorithm Z that decides the language L. Even though a similar algorithm works in the classical
case studied by Goldreich and Krawczyk, our analysis of Z is quite different from the analysis
in [1]. For comparison, we therefore sketch the idea of the algorithm and of its analysis in this
section. The formal details appear in Section 3.
Throughout the paper, we use capital letters to represent random variables, and lower-case
letters to represent individual strings. For a random variable A, we let A also represent its
distribution.
Idea of the algorithm Z: Let x be the input whose membership in L needs to
be decided. Since the protocol Π is QCZK, there exists a simulator S with running
time t polynomial in |x|. Let H be a random variable uniformly distributed in H(2t+
1), where H(2t + 1) is a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of efficiently computable
hash functions from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2, where n1, n2 are the lengths of the first and
second messages, respectively, in Π (see Definition 8). For h ∈ H(2t + 1), let Vh
represent a verifier who, if the first message is α, replies with h(α). Run S on the
random verifier VH and measure S’s output in the computational basis to obtain
the (random) transcript (A,B,C); representing the prover Merlin’s first message, the
verifier Arthur’s response and Merlin’s second message, respectively. Run Arthur’s
acceptance predicate on the modified transcript (A,H(A), C), and declare x ∈ L if
and only if it accepts.
We claim that Z accepts inputs x ∈ L, and rejects inputs x /∈ L, with good completeness and
soundness parameters (see Definition 3).
Sketch of proof: For x ∈ L, by using the zero-knowledge property of L and properties of the
family of hash functions H(2t + 1), it can be verified that the algorithm Z accepts with good
probability. We do not elaborate this case here. Instead we focus on the more interesting case
of x /∈ L. We show that if the algorithm Z accepts a string x /∈ L with probability ǫ, then there
2As every BQP language has a zero-round protocol with a quantum verifier, which is trivially quantum-simulation
black-box ZK, this result characterizes the class BQP.
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exists a cheating Merlin who fools the honest Arthur with probability Ω(ǫ/t2). This contradicts
the protocol’s soundness being non-negligible for ǫ constant and t polynomial.3
The cheating Merlin M∗ is designed as follows. Since the algorithm Z accepts x /∈ L with
probability ǫ, the modified transcript (A,H(A), C) satisfies Arthur’s acceptance predicate with
probability ǫ. Therefore, a natural intention of M∗ could be to act so that the transcript of
the actual interaction is distributed “close” to (A,H(A), C). M∗ can start by sending the first
message A′ (A′ ∈ {0, 1}n1), such that A′ is distributed identical to A. Now Arthur, being honest,
replies with message B′ uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n2 and independent of A′. Now, we cannot
show that the distribution of the first two messages (A′, B′) is either the same, or even close in
ℓ1 distance to the distribution of (A,H(A)). In particular, H(A) is not necessarily independent
of A.
However, using properties of the family H(2t + 1), we will argue below that H(A) is “well
spread out,” i.e., has sufficiently high min-entropy4 even conditioned on the value of A. This
means that (A′, B′) can be “closely coupled” to (A,H(A)). For two distributions P and Q, by
saying that P can be closely coupled to Q, we mean that the probabilities of Q, scaled down by
t2, are point wise less than the corresponding probabilities of P . Note that then if a predicate
accepts Q with probability ǫ, it also accepts P with probability ǫ/t2.
Let us define random variable C′ such that for all α ∈ {0, 1}n1, β ∈ {0, 1}n2, (C′|(A′ = α,B′ =
β)) = (C|(A = α,H(α) = β)). If the first and second messages are α, β respectively, then M∗
sends the third message distributed according to C′|(A′ = α,B′ = β). Due to this strategy of
M∗, the transcript of the actual interaction (A′, B′, C′), remains closely coupled to the modified
simulated transcript, (A,H(A), C). Since we have assumed that the modified simulated transcript
(A,H(A), C) satisfies Arthur’s acceptance predicate with probability ǫ, from property of closely
coupled distributions that we mentioned above, Arthur is fooled to accept the actual transcript
(A′, B′, C′) with probability at least ǫ/t2.
Since B′ is uniform and independent of A′, in order to show that (A′, B′) can be “closely
coupled” to (A,H(A)), it can be verified that it is enough to show that H(A) has high min-
entropy even conditioned on the value of A. Indeed, the main technical lemma of our paper,
Lemma 1, shows that the simulator S, which can be thought of as making at most t queries to H
and outputting A (in which case H,A become correlated random variables), cannot cause H(α)
to have high min-entropy for most α distributed according to A. By definition of min-entropy,
this means for most α, for any β, the probability Pr[H(α) = β|A = α] is small. In order to
provide some intuition, let us assume S ′ is some classical algorithm making at most t queries to
a random function F , chosen uniformly from the set of all functions from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2 and
outputting A ∈ {0, 1}n1. We show the following weaker statement; that is for all β ∈ {0, 1}n2,
Pr[F (A) = β] ≤ t+ 1
2n2
. (1)
Let us fix a β. The goal of S ′ is now to maximize Pr[F (A) = β]. This can be viewed as a search
problem. It is easy to see that the optimal procedure for S ′ is:
Make t different queries to F . If any response is β then output the corresponding
queried location. Otherwise, output any new location.
3In the classical case, the cheating Merlin’s success probability is Ω(ǫ/t), so a quantum black-box simulator can be
no more than quadratically more efficient.
4For a distribution X taking values in X , min-entropy of X is defined to be minx∈X − log Pr[X = x].
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Eq. (1) is now immediate. Note that, since S ′ makes at most t queries to F , this procedure would
also be optimal with the same probability of success even if F were only drawn uniformly from a
strongly (t+1)-universal family of hash functions. In Lemma 1, since S is a quantum algorithm
and we need to show a stronger statement, the proof takes a different track. However, it also
uses a reduction to the black-box search problem.
Here, we would like to point out the main differences between our analysis and the analysis
in [1]:
1. The algorithm in [1] constructs the responses of a random function on the fly, as queries
from S to verifier arrive. Quantumly, however since S is a BQP machine, queries can come
in superposition, and it is difficult to reply to them as a consistent, uniform random function
F, i.e., map
∑
x αx|x〉 7→
∑
x αx|x〉|F (x)〉. It is not even possible to sample efficiently from
the set of all functions from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2, since n1, n2 are polynomial in |x|. This is
why we must use a random hash function H drawn uniformly from H(2t + 1), which is a
much smaller family. However since H still has (2t + 1)-wise independence, it suffices for
our purposes.
2. The more important difference is that [1]’s arguments, showing that if their algorithm ac-
cepts an x /∈ L with good probability then there exists a good cheating prover, are essentially
combinatorial. They can be phrased as inserting the honest Arthur into a random query
round of the simulator. Our arguments however cannot rely just on classical combinatorics,
and a careful rephrasing (as sketched above) is needed to reduce the analysis to quantum
search lower bounds. Since for the purpose of efficiency, we are forced to provide the input
to the search algorithm, from a source of limited independence, a technical contribution of
this work is also in showing that search is hard on average for such inputs as well.
We would like to clarify one more aspect of the algorithm Z. Why does Z use VH , instead of
running the simulator S on the honest Arthur? The reason is that the zero knowledge property
of L only restricts S’s behavior for x ∈ L. However as we argued above, for x /∈ L, we still want
to be sure that S’s output has high min-entropy, even conditioned on its first message. Using an
efficiently computable hash function as a verifier in the algorithm Z, gives us some control on
S’s output even when x /∈ L; we can guarantee that the second message in S’s output is correct,
and therefore not too concentrated. Using a hash function works for the x ∈ L case too, because
the transcript of interaction with VH (averaged over randomness in H) is distributed the same
as the transcript with the honest Arthur.
Finally, the generalization to constant-round AM protocols goes through along similar lines.
These arguments also go through for three-round interactive protocols, by running the simulator
on deterministic verifiers that use as their (private) random coins the hash of the prover’s first
message.
1.1 Organization
We make the necessary definitions including of our models in Section 2. In Section 3, we give the
proof for three-round QAM protocols. We then generalize this proof in two directions. First, we
extend its validity to three-round quantum interactive QIP (private-coins) protocols in Section 5.
Next, in Section 6 we generalize it to constant-round QAM protocols, requiring slightly more
involved notation. In Section 7 we conclude with some open problems.
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2 Preliminaries
We call a function δ negligible, δ ∈ negl(n), if for every positive polynomial p, δ(n) = O(1/p(n)).
Let poly(n) denote the set of functions that are each O(p(n)) for some polynomial p. We call an
algorithm efficient if it can be run on a classical or quantum Turing machine (depending on the
context) whose running time is at most polynomial in the input length.
We often use the following brief notation. Say X1 and X2 are random variables taking values
in X . Let x1, x2 represent elements of X . Then we write, for example, Pr[X1 = X2] to mean
Pr(x1,x2)←(X1,X2)[x1 = x2]. For better familiarity with the usual conventions and notations
concerning random variables and other concepts of probability theory please refer to [4].
2.1 Quantum Oracle
Definition 1. A quantum oracle Uf for a function f : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 is the unitary taking
|x〉|a〉 → |x〉|a⊕ f(x)〉 , (2)
for any x ∈ {0, 1}n1 and a ∈ {0, 1}n2. Here, ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive-or operation.
Note that Uf is its own inverse, so oracle access to Uf and U
−1
f is no more powerful than
oracle access to just Uf .
Below we provide brief definitions of classical and quantum Interactive Proofs, Arthur-Merlin
protocols, Zero-knowledge protocols etc. For more detailed and precise definitions please refer
to [2, 3, 5, 6].
2.2 Interactive proofs (IP) and Arthur-Merlin protocols (AM)
A classical interactive proof (IP) for a language L is a classical communication protocol between
two parties, the prover P and the verifier V . Both parties receive the input x. They exchange
messages, and the verifier finally outputs “accept” or “reject.” The verifier V ’s running time is
bounded by a polynomial in the length of x, but there are no efficiency constraints on P . The
protocol should satisfy completeness and soundness requirements for some constants ǫc, ǫs > 0
with ǫc + ǫs < 2/3:
1. If x ∈ L, then the verifier V accepts with probability at least 1− ǫc.
2. If x /∈ L, then no cheating prover P∗ can make V accept with probability more than ǫs.
An AM protocol is a special kind of interactive proof in which the verifier’s messages are
restricted to be uniformly random coin flips, which are independent of each other and of prover’s
messages.
2.3 Quantum Arthur-Merlin protocol (QAM)
Similar to IP and AM, we can also define quantum analogs, QIP and QAM, where quantum
messages are exchanged, and the verifier can apply quantum operations. For most parts in this
paper, we are concerned with special three-round quantum Arthur-Merlin (QAM) protocols in
which only the third message, from the prover, is quantum. Therefore, we describe in detail
only such protocols in Definition 3 below. The details for the special three-round QIP protocols
and special constant round QAM protocols, with only the last message being quantum, that we
are also concerned with in this paper, can be inferred easily from Definition 3 in an analogous
fashion. We begin with the following definition.
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Definition 2 (Quantum predicate). A quantum predicate is a two-outcome measurement given
by an operator E, 0 ≤ E ≤ I. When applied on a quantum state ρ, the probabilities of the two
outcomes, accept and reject, are TrEρ and Tr(I − E)ρ, respectively. The predicate is efficient if
it can be implemented in polynomial time by a quantum Turing machine.
Definition 3 (Special QAM protocol). In a three-round quantum Arthur-Merlin (QAM) protocol
〈A,M〉 for language L, with the first two messages being classical, verifier Arthur (A) and prover
Merlin (M) are each given the input x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then,
1. Merlin sends Arthur an α ∈ {0, 1}n1.
2. Arthur replies with a uniformly random β ∈ {0, 1}n2, independent of the first message.
3. Merlin sends ρ, a quantum state, and Arthur decides to accept or reject based on an efficient
quantum predicate (depending on x) on the “transcript” |α〉〈α| ⊗ |β〉〈β| ⊗ ρ.
Here n1, n2 ∈ poly(n) and ρ is a state on poly(n) qubits. Note that there are no efficiency
requirements on Merlin. For convenience, we will let (α, β, ρ) denote the transcript. We will also
write “A accepts” to mean that Arthur’s predicate accepts. Let 〈A,M〉(x) denote the distribution
of protocol transcripts (α, β, ρ) between Arthur A and Merlin M. We will also refer to 〈A,M〉(x)
as the verifier’s view in this protocol. The protocol satisfies, for some constants ǫc, ǫs > 0 with
ǫc + ǫs < 2/3:
• Completeness: If x ∈ L, Pr(A accepts 〈A,M〉(x)) ≥ 1− ǫc.
• Soundness: If x /∈ L, then for any possibly cheating MerlinM∗, Pr(A accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)) ≤
ǫs.
In the special three-round QIP protocols that we consider between prover P and verifier V ,
the verifier’s view on input x consists of its private coins together with the transcript of the
interaction. We denote the random variable of this view by 〈P ,V〉(x).
2.4 Zero knowledge
Informally, as we have stated earlier, a zero-knowledge proof for a language L is an interactive
proof for L such that if x ∈ L, then the verifier, no matter what it does, can “learn nothing”
more than the validity of the assertion that x ∈ L [6,7]. For a cheating verifier V∗, the notion of
it not “learning” more is formalized, in the context of the protocols that we consider, using the
definitions as follows.
Definition 4 (Computationally indistinguishability). Two transcript distributions A and B on
n classical or quantum bits, are said to be computationally indistinguishable if for any efficient
quantum predicate M running in time polynomial in n,
|Pr[M accepts A]− Pr[M accepts B]| ∈ negl(n) .
Definition 5 (Quantum computational zero knowledge). An interactive protocol Π (of the special
kinds that we consider) for language L, with prover P and verifier V, is computational zero
knowledge if for every efficient verifier V∗ there exists an efficient quantum algorithm SV∗ , called
the simulator, as follows. Let SV∗(x) be S’s output on input x representing verifier’s view in the
protocol between P and V∗. Then for all x ∈ L, the distributions of SV∗(x) and of verifier V∗’s
actual view 〈P ,V∗〉(x) while interacting with P are computationally indistinguishable.
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Definition 6 (Black-box quantum computational zero knowledge). An interactive protocol Π (of
the special kinds that we consider), is black-box quantum computational zero knowledge if there
exists a single simulator S that works for all efficient verifiers V∗, and that uses the verifier V∗
only as a black-box oracle. That is, the access of S to V∗ is limited to querying V∗ and receiving
the response.
The following remarks are in order:
1. Perfect zero knowledge and statistical zero knowledge are two stronger notions of zero
knowledge that require the distributions of SV∗(x) and of 〈P ,V∗〉(x) to be the same or
statistically indistinguishable, respectively. In the case of perfect zero knowledge, the sim-
ulator is additionally allowed to output “failure” instead of a transcript with probability
≤ 1/2.
2. Unlike the special quantum protocols that we consider, in which only the last message
is quantum, for protocols with more quantum messages, the definition of quantum zero
knowledge needs changes. For precise definitions, please refer to [2, 3].
3 Three-round QAM protocols with the first two messages
classical
In this section we present our result for three-round QAM protocols, Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let L be a language with a three-round QAM protocol Π with the first two messages
classical, as in Definition 3, having completeness and soundness errors ǫc and ǫs, respectively.
Assume that Π is a black-box, quantum computational zero-knowledge protocol. Let S be the
simulator with a running time bounded by t. If t
√
ǫs = o(1− ǫc − negl(n)), then L is in BQP.
In particular, if ǫs is negligible and ǫc a constant, then L ∈ BQP.
Although Definition 6 requires a simulator that works for all efficient verifiers V∗, the proof
of Theorem 1 will only require that the simulator S works for a limited set of verifiers, verifiers
that essentially just apply a fixed function to the prover’s message to determine their reply.
Definition 7. For h : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2, let Vh represent a dishonest verifier who replies
deterministically β = h(α) on message α, and uses the same acceptance predicate as used by
Arthur A.
In fact, in order for Theorem 1 to hold, the simulator S only has to work for the set of cheating
verifiers {Vh : h ∈ H}, where H is a certain strongly t-universal family of hash functions :
Definition 8 (Strongly t-universal family of hash functions). A set H of functions from {0, 1}n1
to {0, 1}n2 is a strongly t-universal family of hash functions if for H chosen uniformly from H,
the random variables {H(α) : α ∈ {0, 1}n1} are t-wise independent and each H(α) is uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}n2.
For all positive integers n1, n2, t, there exists a strongly t-universal family H(n1, n2, t) of
efficiently computable hash functions {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 [8–10].
With these definitions out of the way, we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof goes by presenting and analyzing the following efficient algorithm
Z for deciding membership in L:
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Algorithm Z: Input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Output accept/reject.
1. Draw H uniformly from H := H(n1, n2, 2t+ 1).
2. Run S on VH with input x. Consider the three output registers, corresponding
to the prover’s first message, the verifier’s response, and the prover’s second
message, respectively. In order to ensure that the first two messages in the
simulated transcript are classical, measure the corresponding registers in the
computational basis. Let A and B be the respective random variables ob-
tained after the measurement, and let C be the contents of the third register
after the measurement. Note that C is a random quantum state correlated
with A and B. The output simulated transcript is then (A,B,C).
3. Compute H(A). Run A’s acceptance predicate on the modified simulated
transcript (A,H(A), C), and accept if and only if the predicate accepts.
Algorithm Z runs in polynomial time, since running S, choosing and evaluating a hash
function in H, and running Arthur’s acceptance predicate are all efficient. We claim:
Claim 1. For x ∈ L, Pr[Z accepts x] ≥ 1− ǫc−negl(n). For x /∈ L, Pr[Z accepts x] = O(t√ǫs).
Theorem 1 follows immediately from Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 1. The first two steps of algorithm Z define a joint distribution for (H,A,B,C).
Here, A,B are random variables taking values in binary strings, H is a random hash function,
and C is a random density matrix. Note that the algorithm does not use B, the simulated second
message. Z’s acceptance probability is, from step 3,
Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)] ,
where the probability is over the joint distribution of (H,A,B,C), and also over any randomness
in the acceptance predicate of A.
Case x ∈ L: Let x ∈ L. Our aim is to relate Pr[Z accepts x] to Pr[A accepts 〈A,M〉(x)], which
is at least 1− ǫc by the completeness criterion. We compute
Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)]
=
1
|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[A accepts (A, h(A), C)|H = h]
≥ 1|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[A accepts (A,B,C) ∧ h(A) = B|H = h] (3)
since H is uniform on H, and since adding the check h(A) = B can only reduce the probability.
Note that (A,B,C)|(H = h) is the distribution of the simulator’s output on verifier Vh, after
measuring the registers corresponding to the first two messages. Let 〈Vh,M〉(x) denote the dis-
tribution of protocol transcripts between verifier Vh and MerlinM on input x (see Definition 3).
By the computational zero-knowledge assumption, the acceptance probability of any efficient
predicate on (A,B,C)|(H = h) can differ from the acceptance probability of the same predicate
on 〈Vh,M〉(x) only by a negligible amount. In particular this holds for the following efficient
quantum predicate E: on three-register input ρ, measure the first two registers, and accept iff
(A accepts ρ ∧ h(first register) = second register). Now, on 〈Vh,M〉(x), the second message is
8
by definition h of the first message, so the event (E accepts 〈Vh,M〉(x)) reduces to the event (A
accepts 〈Vh,M〉(x)). Therefore, continuing from Eq. (3) we have:
Pr[Z accepts x] ≥ 1|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[A accepts (A,B,C) ∧ h(A) = B|H = h]
=
1
|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[E accepts (A,B,C)|H = h]
≥ 1|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[E accepts 〈Vh,M〉(x)]− negl(n)
=
1
|H|
∑
h∈H
Pr[A accepts 〈Vh,M〉(x)]− negl(n)
= Pr[A accepts 〈VH ,M〉(x)]− negl(n) .
Finally, sinceH is drawn from a strongly (2t+1)-universal hash family, for each α, H(α) is uni-
formly distributed. Therefore, the transcript 〈VH ,M〉(x) is distributed identically to 〈A,M〉(x);
in either case, the second message is uniformly distributed and independent of the first message.
We conclude
Pr[Z accepts x] ≥ Pr[A accepts 〈VH ,M〉(x)]− negl(n)
= Pr[A accepts 〈A,M〉(x)]− negl(n) (4)
≥ 1− ǫc − negl(n) .
Case x /∈ L: Let x /∈ L. Let q := Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)]. Consider the
following cheating Merlin M∗.
Cheating Merlin M∗ Recall the joint distribution (H,A,B,C) defined by Z.
Note that H,A need not be independent in this joint distribution.
1. On input x, send an α drawn according to A.
2. On receiving A’s message β, send back the quantum state C|(A = α,H(α) =
β) to Arthur. If Pr[H(α) = β|A = α] = 0, then send state |0〉〈0|.
Note that sampling from the conditional distribution C|(A = α,H(α) = β) may not be efficient.
However, M∗ is not required to be efficient.
The cheating probability of M∗ is exactly
Pr[A accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)]
=
∑
(α,β)∈{0,1}n1+n2
Pr[A = α]
1
2n2
Pr[A accepts (α, β, (C|A = α,H(α) = β))] . (5)
The factor of 1/2n2 is the probability with which Arthur replies with a given β. By the soundness
criterion, M∗’s cheating probability is upper-bounded by ǫs.
Intuitively, M∗ is only successful if the uniform distribution of β has sufficient overlap with
the distribution of H(α) from the simulator’s output, at least for most α drawn according to
A. Then the two distributions can be coupled, relating Arthur’s acceptance probability while
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interacting with M∗ to q. An extreme counterexample might be that conditioned on A = α;
H(α) were somehow fixed. Then β would almost never agree with H(α), so M∗ wouldn’t know
what to send for the last message and would have to abort.
Unlike the case x ∈ L, Definition 5 puts no guarantees on the simulator S when x /∈ L, so it
is possible that S’s output (A,B,C) could be very different from 〈A,M〉(x). Regardless, as we
show in the following key lemma, one can argue using black-box query search lower bounds that
H(A) is on average not too concentrated even given A.
Lemma 1 (Search reduction). Let sα := maxβ Pr[H(α) = β|A = α], where (H,A,B,C) is the
joint distribution defined in Z. Then there is a universal constant c such that the expectation
Eα←A[sα] ≤ ct2/2n2 . (6)
The proof is deferred to Section 4.
By applying Markov’s inequality to Eq. (6), we obtain:
Corollary 1. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a set Good ⊆ {0, 1}n1 such that:
1. Pr(A ∈ Good) ≥ 1− δ.
2. For all α ∈ Good, sα ≤ ct2δ2n2 .
Now continuing from Eq. (5), we have
ǫs ≥
∑
α∈Good,β
Pr[A = α]
1
2n2
Pr
[A accepts (α, β, (C∣∣A = α,H(α) = β))]
=
∑
α∈Good,β
Pr[A = α,H(α) = β]
Pr[H(α) = β|A = α]
1
2n2
Pr
[A accepts (α, β, C)∣∣A = α,H(α) = β]
≥ δ
ct2
∑
α∈Good,β
Pr[A = α,H(α) = β] Pr
[A accepts (α, β, C)∣∣A = α,H(α) = β] (7)
=
δ
ct2
Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C), A ∈ Good]
≥ δ
ct2
(Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)]− Pr[A /∈ Good])
≥ δ
ct2
(q − δ) .
The second inequality above follows since Pr[H(α) = β|A = α] ≤ sα ≤ ct2δ2n2 , from the definition of
sα, Lemma 1, and since α ∈ Good. The final inequality uses the definition q = Pr[Z accepts x] =
Pr[A accepts (A,H(A), C)] and Corollary 1. Set δ = q/2 to complete the proof of Claim 1, and
thus also of Theorem 1.
4 Proof of Lemma 1: Reduction to search
Lemma 1 is proved by reducing to search, then applying a search lower bound.
We briefly sketch the idea of the proof first. Let s := Eα←A[sα], where sα is as in the
statement of the lemma. For each α ∈ {0, 1}n1, let
βα := arg maxβ Pr[H(α) = β|A = α] .
10
(Recall the joint distribution of (H,A,B,C) from algorithm Z.) With this definition, note that
s = Pr[H(A) = βA]. Let (A
′, B′, C′) be the simulator S’s output when run on VF , where F is
a uniformly random function from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2. Let s′ := Pr[F (A′) = βA′ ], where the
probability is over both F and the simulator. First, we argue that s′ = s because the set of
random variables {H(α) : α ∈ {0, 1}n1} have sufficient independence. Next, by reduction to
black-box search and using known quantum search lower bounds, we argue that the probability
of the event (F (A′) = βA′) is O(t
2/2n2) for any algorithm—in particular for S—that makes at
most t queries to oracle for F and outputs A′. We now present the formal proof.
Lemma 2. Let H be uniformly distributed in H(2t+ 1) and let F be uniformly distributed over
the set of all functions {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2. Let A = AH ∈ {0, 1}n1 be the classical output, after
measurement, of a quantum algorithm A that starts in state |0〉 and makes at most t oracle queries
to H. Let A′ = AF ∈ {0, 1}n1 be the corresponding output when A is run on F . Then (A,H(A))
and (A′, F (A′)) have the same distribution. In particular, Pr[H(A) = βA] = Pr[F (A
′) = βA′ ].
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows by application of the polynomial method [11,12]. Given a
string x = (xα)α∈{0,1}n1 ∈ {0, 1}n22n1 , let fx : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 be the function fx(α) = xα.
It is well known that the state of the quantum query algorithm A starting at |0〉, after t queries
to the oracle for function fx is ∑
z
pz(x)|z〉 ,
where the coefficients pz(x) are polynomials in the binary variables xα,i with α ∈ {0, 1}n1 and
i ∈ [n2] := {1, . . . , n2}. A block, for any fixed α, consists of the variables xα,i with i ∈ [n2].
Also, it can be verified through standard arguments, that each pz(x) has “block degree” at most
t, meaning that each term involves variables xα,i for at most t different α:
pz(x) =
∑
d≤t
α1,...,αd∈{0,1}
n1
S1,...,Sd⊆[n2]
pz,α1,...,αd,S1,...,Sd
d∏
j=1
∏
i∈Sj
xαj ,i
Therefore, for a fixed x ∈ {0, 1}n22n1 , on making t queries to the oracle for fx, the probability
of output of any particular α is a polynomial of block degree at most 2t [11]. By making one
additional query to oracle for fx, one can instead output (α, xα), which increases the block degree
by at most one. That is, the probability of output (α, xα) is a polynomial of block degree at
most 2t + 1. Averaging this polynomial over the oracle being H gives the same probability as
averaging over F by strong (2t+1)-universality. In either case, the variables xα are (2t+1)-wise
independent and uniform. Therefore, (A,H(A)) and (A′, F (A′)) have the same distribution.
Lemma 3. Let F be uniformly distributed over the set of all functions {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2. Fix
a sequence (βα)α∈{0,1}n1 of elements of {0, 1}n2. Let A ∈ {0, 1}n1 be the classical output, after
measurement, of a quantum algorithm A that starts in state |0〉 and makes at most t oracle
queries to F .
Pr[F (A) = βA] = O(t
2/2n2) . (8)
Remark 1. We state without proof that if A in Lemma 3 was a classical algorithm making at
most t oracle queries to F , then we would have the stronger statement Pr[F (A) = βA] = O(t/2
n2).
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Proof of Lemma 3. Let S := {x ∈ {0, 1}2n2 : x has a 1 in exactly one position}. Let X be a
random variable uniformly distributed in S. Standard search lower bounds imply that with t
oracle queries to the bits of X , the probability of a quantum algorithm to find the location of
the 1 is O(t2/2n2) [11]. (The same bound for a classical algorithm is O(t/2n2).)
Now algorithm A can be used to construct an algorithm B for finding the 1 in X as follows:
Algorithm B: Fix G a function chosen uniformly from the set of all functions from
{0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}n2. For each α ∈ {0, 1}n1, fix Zα a string chosen uniformly from
{0, 1}n2 r {βα}. Define,
F (α) =
{
βα if XG(α) = 1
Zα if XG(α) = 0
.
Note that F : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 is a uniformly random function, when averaged over
the choices of X,G and the Zαs. Now run A. When A makes a query to α ∈ {0, 1}n1,
return F (α).5 When A stops, measure A’s output A′, and output G(A′).
From the above construction, finding βα in F implies finding a 1 in X . Moreover, since A makes
at most t queries to F , B makes at most 2t queries to X . Therefore,
Pr[F (A′) = βA′ ] = Pr[X(G(A
′)) = 1] = O(t2/2n2) .
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall the joint distribution of (H,A,B,C) from the algorithm Z. Lemma 1
now follows from above two lemmas by setting A := S, βα := arg maxβ Pr[H(α) = β|A = α] and
observing that Eα←A[sα] = Pr[H(A) = βA], where sα is as in the statement of the Lemma 1.
5 Three-round QIP protocols
The extension of Theorem 1 to a three-round interactive proof 〈V ,P〉, follows on similar lines as
the three-round QAM case, with a few differences that we will highlight. Let us first introduce
the notation for this section.
Notation: In an interactive proof, the honest verifier V is given coins R drawn uniformly at
random from {0, 1}nc at the beginning of the protocol. For a string r, let Vr : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2
be the function determining verifier’s V ’s response to the prover’s first message, when the coins
are fixed to r. We will also write “Vr accepts” to mean that V ’s predicate with coins r accepts.
For a function h : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}nc, define the dishonest verifier Vh to behave exactly as the
honest verifier V does with coins h(α), where α is the prover’s first message. In particular, Vh
responds to message α with Vh(α)(α). Vh’s view of the interaction therefore consists of the two
messages from the prover.
The result for this section is:
Theorem 2. Let L be a language with a three-round interactive protocol Π, with possibly the
last message from prover being quantum, having completeness and soundness errors ǫc and ǫs,
respectively. Assume that Π is a black-box, quantum computational zero-knowledge protocol. Let
S be the simulator with a running time bounded by t. If t√ǫs = o(1− ǫc − negl(n)), then L is in
BQP.
5This response can be implemented in superposition, using at most two oracle queries to X: choose βα or Zα
depending on XG(α), then uncompute XG(α). It is not necessarily efficient, except in terms of oracle queries.
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Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1, with some modifications to the
algorithm and the cheating prover. The new efficient algorithm Z ′ for language L is:
Algorithm Z ′: Input x ∈ {0, 1}n, Output accept/reject.
1. Choose H uniformly at random from H(2t + 1). Run S (with input x) on
VH and measure its output corresponding to the first message from P in the
computational basis to obtain the classical random variable A. Let C be the
output of S corresponding to the last message from P .
2. Accept if and only if VH(A) accepts the transcript (A,VH(A)(A), C).
As before we have the following claim:
Claim 2. For x ∈ L, Pr[Z ′ accepts x] ≥ 1−ǫc−negl(n). For x /∈ L, Pr[Z ′ accepts x] = O(t√ǫs).
It is easy to verify that the algorithm Z ′ runs in polynomial time. Theorem 2 then follows
immediately from Claim 2.
Proof of Claim 2. The case x ∈ L goes along similar lines as in the proof of Theorem 1 and we
skip the details for brevity.
Consider the case x /∈ L. Let B := VH(A)(A). Algorithm Z ′ defines a joint distribution for
(H,A,B,C). Let F be chosen uniformly from the set of all functions from {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}nc.
Run the simulator S on VF and let A′, C′ be its outputs analogous to A,C. Let B′ := VF (A′)(A′).
Since S makes at most t queries, using arguments as in proof of Lemma 2 we have,
q := Pr[Z ′ accepts x] = Pr[VH(A) accepts (A,B,C)]
= Pr[VF (A′) accepts (A′, B′, C′)] . (9)
The main property that we need to observe in this case is:
Lemma 4. For all α ∈ {0, 1}n1 and β ∈ {0, 1}n2, the random variables F (α)|(A′ = α,B′ = β)
and C′|(A′ = α,B′ = β) are independent. In other words, for all α ∈ {0, 1}n1, we have following
Markov network:6
(F (α)|A′ = α)→ (B′|A′ = α)→ (C′|A′ = α) .
Proof. Let N := 2n1 . For every α ∈ {0, 1}n1, define the random variable Y (α) := VF (α)(α), so
B′ = Y (A′). Note that the simulator S, while querying VF , has oracle access only to the random
function Y : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}n2 and not directly to the random function F : {0, 1}n1 → {0, 1}nc.
Therefore the following is a Markov network:
(F (1)F (2) . . . F (N))→ (Y (1)Y (2) . . . Y (N))→ (A′, C′) .
The random variables (F (1)F (2) . . . F (N)) are all independent of each other. Also, since for each
α, Y (α) is a function only of α and F (α), the random variables (Y (1)Y (2) . . . Y (N)) are also all
independent of each other. Therefore for every α ∈ {0, 1}n1 we also have the following Markov
network:
F (α)→ Y (α)→ (A′, C′) ,
which remains a Markov network if we condition each variable on A′ = α, as claimed.
6The random variables X, Y, Z taking values in X ,Y,Z are said to form a Markov network X → Y → Z if for all
y ∈ Y the random variables X|(Y = y) and Z|(Y = y) are independent.
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Exactly on the lines of Lemma 1, search lower bounds imply:
Lemma 5. Let sα := maxr∈{0,1}nc Pr[F (α) = r|A′ = α], where (F,A′, B′, C′) is the joint
distribution defined as above. Then there is a universal constant c such that the expectation
Eα←A′ [sα] ≤ ct2/2nc . (10)
Applying Markov’s inequality to Eq. (10) gives:
Corollary 2. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a set Good ⊆ {0, 1}n1 such that:
1. Pr(A′ ∈ Good) ≥ 1− δ.
2. For all α ∈ Good, sα ≤ ct2δ2nc .
Now define the cheating prover P∗ as:
Cheating prover P∗: Recall the joint distribution (F,A′, B′, C′) defined earlier.
1. On input x, send α drawn from A′.
2. On receiving the honest verifier V ’s message β, send back message to V ,
distributed according to C′|(A′ = α,B′ = β).
Now the cheating probability of P∗ is Pr[V accepts 〈V ,P∗〉(x)]. Therefore,
ǫs ≥ Pr[V accepts 〈V ,P∗〉(x)]
=
∑
(α,r)∈{0,1}n1+nc
Pr[A′ = α]
1
2nc
Pr[Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α,B′ = Vr(α)))]
≥
∑
α∈Good,r
Pr[A′ = α]
1
2nc
Pr[Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α,B′ = Vr(α)))]
=
∑
α∈Good,r
Pr[A′ = α, F (α) = r]
Pr[F (α) = r|A′ = α]
1
2nc
Pr[Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α,B′ = Vr(α)))]
≥ δ
ct2
∑
α∈Good,r
Pr[A′ = α, F (α) = r] Pr[Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α,B′ = Vr(α)))]
=
δ
ct2
∑
α∈Good,r
Pr[A′ = α, F (α) = r] Pr[Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α, F (α) = r))]
=
δ
ct2
∑
α∈Good,r
Pr[A′ = α, F (α) = r,Vr accepts (α,Vr(α), (C′|A′ = α, F (α) = r))]
=
δ
ct2
Pr[VF (A′) accepts (A′, B′, C′), A′ ∈ Good]
=
δ
ct2
(Pr[VF (A′) accepts (A′, B′, C′)]− Pr[A′ /∈ Good])
≥ δ
ct2
(q − δ) .
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The third inequality above follows since Pr[F (α) = r|a′ = α] ≤ sα ≤ ct2δ2nc (from Corollary 2, the
definition of sα, and since α ∈ Good). The third equality above follows since from Lemma 4,
(C′|A′ = α,B′ = Vr(α)) = (C′|A′ = α, F (α) = r, B′ = Vr(α)) = (C′|A′ = α, F (α) = r) .
The final inequality uses Eq. (9) and Corollary 2. Set δ = q/2 to complete the proof of Claim 2,
and thus also of Theorem 2.
Remark 2. While we extend the three-round QAM proof to constant-round QAM protocols, as
in Section 6, this proof for three-round QIP protocols cannot be similarly extended. The proof
would only work for constant-round QIP protocols if the honest verifier were guaranteed to use
independent randomness to determine his response in each round. The proof breaks down if it
refers to the same randomness for different messages. In that case, the black-box simulator’s
output transcript need not only depend on the verifier’s messages. It may depend directly on the
randomness behind that message, and so the analog to Lemma 4 would be false.
6 Constant-round QAM protocols with only the last mes-
sage quantum
In this section, we extend Theorem 1 for three-round QAM protocols to (2k + 1)-round QAM
protocols with all but the last message classical, for k any constant.
Theorem 3. Let k be a fixed positive integer. Let L be a language with a (2k + 1)-round QAM
protocol Π, with all but the last message classical, having completeness and soundness errors
ǫc and ǫs, respectively. Assume that Π is a black-box, quantum computational zero-knowledge
protocol. Let S be the simulator with a running time bounded by t. If (t2kǫs)1/(k+1) = o(1− ǫc −
negl(n)), then L is in BQP.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the first message is from the prover M. We will
use the following notation.
Notation: For an indexed variable xi, let x
j
1 denote the j-tuple (x1, x2, . . . , xj). Let ni be the
length of the ith message in the protocol. For each i ∈ [k], let Hi be a strongly (2t+1)-universal
family of efficiently computable hash functions {0, 1}Ni → {0, 1}n2i, withNi = n1+n2+· · ·+n2i−1
and a t to be specified later (Definition 8). We will use α1, . . . , α2k to denote classical messages of
the first 2j rounds. For hash functions, hk1 := (h1, . . . , hk) ∈ H1× · · ·×Hk, let Ahk1 represent the
deterministic dishonest Arthur who returns hi(α
2i−1
1 ) as the (2i)th message when the transcript
of the first 2i− 1 messages is α2i−11 .
Black-box access is modeled by giving the simulator S access to k oracles, evaluating the k
hash functions (on arbitrary inputs). The oracle Uhi takes
|x〉|a〉|b〉 → |c〉|x〉|a ⊕ hi(x)〉|b〉
Equivalently, the simulator can be given a single oracle that takes as input also the round number
to apply the appropriate hash function.
Let the random variables Hi be uniformly and independently distributed over Hi. H
k
1 :=
(H1, . . . , Hk). Let (A1, A3, . . . , A2k+1) be the simulator S’s output for Arthur’s view, correspond-
ing to the prover’s messages only, when run on the random verifier AHk
1
. (A1, A3, . . . , A2k−1 are
random classical messages, while A2k+1 is a random density matrix.) Let A2i = Hi(A
2i−1
1 ), so
15
A2k+11 := (A1, A2, . . . , A2k+1). Thus running S on AHk1 overall defines a joint distribution over
(Hk1 , A
2k+1
1 ). As in the three-round case, our algorithm Z for deciding L is:
Algorithm Z: On input x, using the simulator S, sample from the distribution
A2k+11 . Accept if and only if the sampled message satisfies Arthur’s acceptance
predicate.
Our main claim will be:
Claim 3. For x ∈ L, Pr[Z accepts x] ≥ 1 − ǫc − negl(n). For x /∈ L, Pr[Z accepts x] =
O((t2kǫs)
1/(k+1)).
Algorithm Z runs in polynomial time, since S, choosing and evaluating various hash functions,
and Arthur’s acceptance predicate are all efficient. Therefore, Theorem 3 follows immediately
from Claim 3.
Proof of Claim 3. Let
q := Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts A2k+11 ] . (11)
For x ∈ L, Z accepts with good probability by the computational zero knowledge assumption
and by averaging over the hash functions, as in Theorem 1. We skip the details for brevity and
focus on the x /∈ L case. Define a cheating Merlin M∗ as follows:
Cheating Merlin M∗: If the transcript so far is α2i1 , send the next message
according to the distribution of A2i+1|(A2i1 = α2i1 ).
The cheating probability of M∗ is Pr[A accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)]. Therefore,
ǫs ≥ Pr[A accepts 〈A,M∗〉(x)]
=
∑
α2k+1
1
∈{0,1}Nk+1

Pr[A1 = α1] 12n2 Pr[A3 = α3|A21 = α21] · · · 12n2k Pr[A2k+1 = α2k+1|A2k1 = α2k1 ]
×Pr[A accepts α2k+11 ]

 .
(12)
Let
α2i(α
2i−1
1 ) := arg maxα2i Pr[A2i = α2i|A2i−11 = α2i−11 ] .
Then using arguments involving search lower bounds as in Lemma 3, we can similarly conclude:
∀i ∈ [k] : Pr[A2i = α2i(A2i−11 )] ≤
ct2
2n2i
for some constant c. Let δ ∈ (0, 1]. By Markov’s inequality, for all i ∈ [k], there exists Goodi ⊆
{0, 1}Ni, such that:
1. Pr[A2i−11 ∈ Goodi] ≥ 1− δ.
2. For all α2i−11 ∈ Goodi, Pr[A2i = α2i(A2i−11 )|A2i−11 = α2i−11 ] ≤ ct
2
δ2n2i .
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Let Good =
⋂k
i=1 Goodi × {0, 1}Nk+1−Ni . Then
Pr[A2k+11 ∈ Good] ≥ 1− kδ . (13)
Now from Eq. (12), we have:
ǫs ≥
∑
α2k+1
1
∈{0,1}Nk+1

Pr[A1 = α1] 12n2 Pr[A3 = α3|A21 = α21] · · · 12n2k Pr[A2k+1 = α2k+1|A2k1 = α2k1 ]
×Pr[A accepts α2k+11 ]


≥
∑
α2k+1
1
∈Good


( δct2 Pr[A2 = α2|A1 = α1]) · · · ( δct2 Pr[A2k = α2k|A2k−11 = α2k−11 ])
×Pr[A1 = α1] Pr[A3 = α3|A21 = α21] · · ·Pr[A2k+1 = α2k+1|A2k1 = α2k1 ]
×Pr[A accepts α2k+11 ]


=
(
δ
ct2
)k
Pr[A accepts A2k+11 , A2k+11 ∈ Good]
≥
(
δ
ct2
)k
(Pr[A accepts A2k+11 ]− Pr[A2k+11 /∈ Good])
≥
(
δ
ct2
)k
(q − kδ) .
The first inequality is by restricting the sum to good transcripts, and inserting terms δ2
n2i
ct2 Pr[A2i =
α2i(A
2i−1
1 )|A2i−11 = α2i−11 ] ≤ 1. (Compare to Eq. (7).) The last inequality follows from Eq. (11)
and Eq. (13). Setting δ = q/(2k), completes the proof.
Remark 3. This proof would not have gone through had we defined A2i = Hi(A2i−1); it is
necessary to hash the entire preceding transcript A2i = Hi(A
2i−1
1 ) (as in [1]), in order to put an
upper bound on Pr[A2i = α2i|A2i−11 = a2i−11 ] ≤ Pr[A2i = α2i(A2i−11 )|A2i−11 = a2i−11 ].
7 Open problems
Many open problems remain related to this work. We would like to be able to analyze protocols
with more “quantum-ness.” For example, what can one say about three-round interactive proofs
with classical messages but a quantum verifier? Here the honest verifier may not even have
any private coins, but instead may use quantum mechanics to randomize. Since the verifier’s
response will no longer be a deterministic function Vr(α) of its coins r and the first message α,
our approach of setting the coins equal to a function h(α) will not make sense.
Also, we would like to understand QAM protocols in which all the prover’s messages are
quantum. The problem currently is that hashing the first message (say, in the computational
basis) collapses its state. Therefore it is no longer true that the honest-verifier transcript is the
same as the average of the hash-function verifiers transcripts, so the key equality in the x ∈ L
case, Eq. (4), will no longer hold.
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